WHY ILLINOIS SHOULD ADOPT FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(18) TO ALLOW THE
LEARNED TREATISE EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE
Ralph Ruebner,* Katarina Durcova** & Amy Taylor***

I. INTRODUCTION
Illinois still adheres to a rigid and outdated common law principle that
treats a learned treatise as hearsay. This principle stands at odds with the
adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 (“FRE 703”)1 and 705 (“FRE
705”)2 by the Illinois Supreme Court.3 Illinois courts have developed
clever ways to get around the common law prohibition thereby creating an
incoherent and inconsistent jurisprudence that at times yields bizarre
outcomes.
Adopting the federal learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule
would set out a consistent standard in Illinois for admitting learned treatises
and allowing them as substantive evidence. Now that Illinois has codified
the Illinois Rules of Evidence,4 including provisions similar to FRE 7035
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ILL. R. EVID. 703.
ILL. R. EVID. 705.
Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326 (Ill. 1981).
ILL. R. EVID. 1102. The rules were adopted on September 27, 2010, and effective as of January 1,
2011. Id.
Compare ILL. R. EVID. 703 (“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”), with
FED. R. EVID. 703 (“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the
opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that
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and 705,6 it is time to adopt the learned treatise exception to the hearsay
rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) (“FRE 803(18)”)7. This will
complete the incorporation cycle.8 More importantly, it will enhance the
efficiency of trials in Illinois courts. Failure to adopt an Illinois equivalent
of FRE 803(18) will impede the full and proper application of Illinois Rule
of Evidence 703 (“IRE 703”) and 705 (“IRE 705”).
This Article will lay out the current standards in Illinois regarding the
use of learned treatises. It will focus on the inconsistencies in the
application of the current Illinois common law and then address how
adoption of a learned treatise exception to hearsay will increase efficiency
among trial courts.
II. CURRENT USE OF LEARNED TREATISES IN ILLINOIS
Currently, in Illinois, a learned treatise is inadmissible as substantive
evidence because it is deemed to be hearsay. A learned treatise can be
used to impeach an expert witness on cross-examination and to rehabilitate
the expert witness during re-direct examination.9 This rule allowing a
learned treatise for impeachment and rehabilitation purposes has evolved.

6.

7.

8.

9.

their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.”) (emphasis added to show difference between Illinois and Federal Rule).
Illinois Rule of Evidence 705 - Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion states,
“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefore without first
testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in
any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” ILL. R.
EVID. 705.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) states:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness:
(18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement
contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination
or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or
testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice.
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
SPEC. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON ILL. EVIDENCE, COMMITTEE COMMENTARY ON THE ILLINOIS
RULES OF EVIDENCE (2010), available at https://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/
Evidence/Evidence.htm [hereinafter Committee Commentary]. Other Federal Rules of Evidence
that Illinois has not adopted are FRE 407 and FRE 803(1). Id. The IRE Committee Commentary
states that the reason for not incorporating Rule 407, Subsequent Remedial Measures, is “because
Appellate Court opinions are sufficiently in conflict concerning a core issue that is now under
review by the Supreme Court.” Id.
Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing the Useful Information Provided by Experts in the
Courtroom: A Comparison of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 803(18) with the Evidence Rules
in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 183 (1995).
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This section will first address the current rules regarding
impeachment, cross-examination, and discovery issues related to learned
treatises. Next, this section will discuss the requirements for setting up
foundation and establishing authoritativeness.
A. Cross-Examination, Impeachment, and the Confusion of Discovery
Since 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court has allowed for the “liberal”
use of a learned treatise “for impeachment purposes” on crossexamination.10 In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,
the Supreme Court allowed cross-examination of an expert witness “as to
the views of recognized authorities, expressed in treatises or periodicals
written for professional colleagues.”11 It extended the impeachment of the
expert’s opinion with a learned treatise regardless whether the expert relied
or did not rely on that text in forming the basis of his or her opinion.12 The
Illinois Supreme Court explained that to prevent such cross-examination
would “protect the ignorant or unscrupulous expert witness.”13 The learned
treatise may therefore be used on cross-examination by “reading from the
treatise and asking the witness if the witness agrees with the statements
read.”14 On cross-examination, counsel should have “the widest latitude to
. . . demonstrate any interest, bias, or motive of the expert witness to testify,
and to test his accuracy, recollection and credibility.”15 To perfect crossexamination, counsel may delve into the “facts, data, and opinions which
form the basis of the expert’s opinion but which are not disclosed on direct
examination . . . .”16
Some have argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that a learned treatise which
a party intended to use to impeach an expert witness should be disclosed
during discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 213.17 Supreme Court
Rule 213 provides the limitations on written interrogatories in civil cases.
Specifically, Rule 213(g) limits the information admissible on direct
examination to information that was disclosed in a Rule 213(f) answer or in
a discovery deposition.18 Rule 213(g), however, places no such limitation
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 254 (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill. 1965)).
Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 259.
Id. at 258–61.
Id. at 259.
11 WILLIAM A. SCHROEDER, ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES: COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON ILLINOIS
EVIDENCE § 803(18):1 (2014) (citing Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 258–61; Fornoff v. Parke Davis &
Co., 434 N.E.2d 793, 800–01 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
Piano v. Davison, 510 N.E.2d 1066, 1081–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Mielke v. Condell
Mem’l Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 216, 220–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)).
Id. at 1081.
Stapleton ex rel. Clark v. Moore, 932 N.E.2d 487, 497–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing Maffett v.
Bliss, 771 N.E.2d 445, 457–58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213.
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on information used during cross-examination.19 In fact, Rule 213(g)
explicitly states that, “Without making disclosure under this rule, however,
a cross-examining party can elicit information, including opinions, from the
witness.”20 Rule 213(g) therefore “does not require that a party disclose
journal articles that the party intends to use in cross-examining the
opposing party’s [expert] opinion witness,”21 because “[t]he disclosure
requirements of Rule 213 simply do not apply to cross-examination of an
opposing party’s opinion witness.”22
It should be noted that Rule 213 is a discovery rule and does not
govern the admissibility of learned treatises. In a footnote in Stapleton ex
rel. Clark v. Moore, the appellate court noted that some confusion may
arise with practitioners who are familiar with FRE 803(18), because the
federal rule allows admissibility of a learned treatise as substantive
evidence once the materials are established as reliable.23 The court
explained that Rule 213 disclosure requirements do not apply to crossexamination.24 Rule 213 also does not require disclosures of learned
treatises intended to be used on cross-examination of an expert witness.25
The court in Stapleton noted that once a treatise is established as
authoritative by judicial notice or by the testimony of the opposing party’s
expert witness, the author of a learned treatise is established as an expert in
that particular field.26 Unlike the federal rule, however, Illinois courts will
not admit the treatise itself as substantive evidence.27
Although Stapleton addressed the use of learned treatises, the
appellate court appears to have confused the issue at hand and applied a
Rule 213 analysis. As noted, Rule 213 is a discovery rule that imposes
disclosure requirements on the parties. It does not address the foundation
for establishing the authoritativeness of the learned treatise or its author.
The limited use of a learned treatise in Illinois is currently governed by
common law and does not implicate Rule 213, although an untimely
disclosure of a party’s intent to use a learned treatise may be among the
factors that an appellate court may use in determining whether the use of
the learned treatise prejudiced the opponent.28
For instance, in Sharbono v. Hilborn, the appellate court found that
the use of diagrams taken from a learned treatise was highly prejudicial
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Stapleton, 932 N.E.2d at 497.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498 n.1.
Id. at 497.
Maffett v. Bliss, 771 N.E.2d 445, 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
Stapleton, 932 N.E.2d at 497.
Id. at 498 n.1.
Sharbono v. Hilborn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶ 36, 12 N.E.3d 530, 545.
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because the defendant failed to establish proper foundation for their
introduction, the diagrams helped to bolster the defendant’s expert medical
opinion with respect to a very substantial issue in the case, and the
defendant failed to timely disclose the diagrams under Supreme Court Rule
213.29 The appellate court noted that IRE 703 and 705 place the burden on
the adverse party on cross-examination to challenge the facts that underlie
the expert’s opinion.30 As such, the appellate court concluded that “it is a
matter of fundamental fairness that the adverse party be given proper and
timely disclosure so that it may have the opportunity to prepare for crossexamination.”31 The court found that
[w]ithout timely disclosure, plaintiff was completely deprived of her
ability to effectively cross-examine defendant[’s expert] as to such matters
as the extent of his reliance on the treatise, whether the treatise was truly a
reliable authority, whether the specific images and diagrams in question
were reliable, and whether it was reasonable for defendant[’s expert] to
rely on the treatise in this case.32

B. Foundation and Establishing Authoritativeness
In Illinois and under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponents of
a learned treatise must establish proper foundation for the authoritativeness
of the publication.33 Under FRE 803(18), the standard for determining the
authoritativeness of a treatise is as follows: “[to the extent] called to the
attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the
expert on direct examination,” statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets may be admitted as substantive evidence as an
exception to hearsay if such materials themselves are “established as a
reliable authority by the expert’s admission or testimony, by another
expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice.”34 Judicial notice, however, does
not assign probative value to evidence; it operates only to qualify a work as
reliable.35
The appellate court in Bowman v. University of Chicago Hospitals,
addressed the process of establishing whether a source is “authoritative.”36
Bowman was a medical negligence case brought following the death of a
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id., 12 N.E.3d at 545.
Id., 12 N.E.3d at 545.
Id., 12 N.E.3d at 545.
Id. at ¶ 37, 12 N.E.3d at 545.
Stapleton ex rel. Clark v. Moore, 932 N.E.2d 487, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing Darling v.
Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill. 1965)).
FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (emphasis added).
GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 667–69 (7th ed. 2011).
Bowman v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 852 N.E.2d 383, 392–93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
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premature baby from a bacterial infection.37 On direct examination, the
plaintiff’s expert admitted that he had relied on hospital charts for the basis
of his opinion that the child’s death could have been prevented with a
timely dose of antibiotics.38 The defendants then cross-examined the
plaintiff’s expert with medical literature, inquiring whether the treatise
“suggested a point at which certain blood counts required” the
administration of medication.39 Two of the plaintiff’s experts admitted on
cross-examination that the text was “a good source,” “standard book,” and
was “well-respected.”40 The plaintiff argued on appeal that the defendant
failed to establish proper foundation for the introduction of the medical
text.41 The appellate court rejected the claim, finding that the defendant
sufficiently established the particular text as reliable.42 It did not matter that
the witnesses did not use the term “authoritative.”43 The court reaffirmed
the principle that on cross-examination “a recognized text or treatise is
proper where either the court has taken judicial notice of the author’s
competence or, absent concession by the witness, the cross-examiner
proves the text or treatise is authoritative.”44 The court further noted that
“[a]n author’s competence can be established by a witness with expertise in
the subject matter.”45 Here, the court found that the statements made by the
plaintiff’s experts met the standard under Darling to satisfy a showing of
author’s competence46 and that the term “authoritative” was not
determinative in establishing the reliability or credibility of the source.47
The court concluded that once a text “is shown to be authoritative, any
concerns that it is not ‘scientific enough’ go to weight and not to
admissibility.”48
Most recently, in Sharbono v. Hilborn, the defendant in a medical
negligence case sought to use a Power Point presentation containing
drawings and images taken from a learned treatise, as well as copies of the
mammograms and ultrasounds taken of the plaintiff as demonstrative
evidence.49 The Power Point slides with images of the plaintiff’s
mammograms and ultrasounds contained descriptive headings often using
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 385–87.
Id. at 391–93.
Id. at 392–93.
Id.
Id. at 392 (quoting People v. Johnson, 564 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
Id. (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259–60 (Ill. 1965)).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 392–93.
11 SCHROEDER, supra note 14 (citing Nassar v. Cnty. of Cook, 333 Ill. App. 3d 289 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002)).
Sharbono v. Hilborn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶15, 12 N.E.3d 530, 537.

2015]

Why Illinois Should Adopt FRE 803(18)

281

the word “benign” along with the name of the particular treatise used.50
The defendant sought to use the Power Point “to help the jury understand
the complicated medical testimony” during defendant radiologists’
testimony on direct examination.51 Defense counsel distinguished between
images taken from the treatise from those identified as the plaintiff’s and
“stressed numerous times” that the treatise images were being used for
demonstrative purposes only.52 Following deliberations, the jury entered a
verdict in favor of the defendant.53
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant failed to establish
the proper foundation for the Power Point presentation, that the exhibit
could not be introduced on direct examination, and the exhibit was
improperly used to bolster the defendant’s medical opinion that he had
correctly diagnosed the plaintiff’s lesions as benign.54 The appellate court
found that the exhibit “went well beyond merely trying to teach or educate
the jury . . . .”55 Rather, the court found that the exhibit “help[ed] show the
basis of [the] defendant’s own medical opinion in this case and to support
his diagnosis” which found the plaintiff’s lesions to be benign.56 The
appellate court also found that the defendant had failed to establish a proper
foundation for the reliability of the treatise as required under IRE 703 and
Wilson v. Clark.57 The court concluded that the use of the diagrams “went
right to the heart of the malpractice claim” and was therefore “highly
prejudicial.”58
The appellate court’s reasoning and the outcome in Sharbono
complicate a proponent’s ability to establish the authoritativeness of a
learned treatise and, in this case, to explain the basis of the expert’s opinion
at trial. The appellate court in Sharbono set as high a standard in Illinois
for the use of demonstrative evidence as is generally used for the
admissibility of evidence. Such an outcome is simply not justified under
Illinois practice.
Similar to the court’s concerns in Sharbono, other courts have
attempted to distinguish between an expert’s intent to provide a foundation
for his or her opinion and the expert’s attempt to merely bolster his or her
opinion.59 Only the former is allowed. The distinction between providing a

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶16, 12 N.E.3d at 538.
Id. at ¶20, 12 N.E.3d at 539.
Id. at ¶27, 12 N.E.3d at 541.
Id. at ¶33, 12 N.E.3d at 543.
Id.
Id. at ¶35, 12 N.E.3d at 544.
Id. at ¶36, 12 N.E.3d at 544.
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 237.

282

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

foundation for an opinion and merely bolstering the opinion, however, is
confusing to litigators and courts alike.60
Consistent with FRE 803(18), the standard for establishing the
authoritativeness or reliability of an author in the relevant field may be
established by a witness who is an expert in the field,61 if a “witness
concedes the author’s competence,”62 or by judicial notice.63 Although the
standard for determining the authoritativeness of a treatise is the same
under Illinois64 and the Federal Rules of Evidence,65 under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the statement can be admitted substantively, but it will
not be submitted as an exhibit to the jury. Illinois common law rules of
evidence only permit an expert witness to read from a reliable publication;
however, the statements in it will not be admitted substantively66 or
submitted as an exhibit to the jury.67 Illinois common law rules essentially
expect the jurors to hear but not see the exhibits; allowing them to listen to
the evidence, but preventing them from actually using this evidence
substantively to make their ultimate determination. How we treat a learned
treatise in Illinois and how it can be used at trial can only lead to jury
confusion.
C. Treatises Are Generally Not Admissible as Substantive Evidence
In Illinois, learned treatises are inadmissible as substantive evidence
because they constitute hearsay.68 Illinois courts reject the substantive use
of learned treatises because of their concerns that learned treatises will
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

Id.
Stapleton ex rel. Clark v. Moore, 932 N.E.2d 487, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (quoting Downey v.
Dunnington, 895 N.E.2d 271, 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)). See also Darling v. Charleston Cmty.
Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259–60. (Ill. 1965).
Downey, 895 N.E.2d at 297 (quoting Bowman v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 852 N.E.2d 289, 292-93
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
Id. (quoting Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 259–60).
Id.
Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 609 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1980).
Fornoff v. Parke Davis & Co., 434 N.E.2d 793, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Darling, 211 N.E.2d at
259-60; Walski v. Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. 1978). The trial court in Downey v.
Dunnington erred in not allowing the use of a medical article on cross when it was admissible.
Downey, 895 N.E.2d at 297.
Terrence J. Lavin & Michelle L. Wolf, Expanding the Use of Medical Treatises in Illinois Trials,
94 ILL. B.J. 426, 427–28 (2006) (citing Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 259); FED. R. EVID. 803(18)).
Id. (citing Hoem v. Zia, 606 N.E.2d 818, 833–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). See also 11 SCHROEDER,
supra note 14 (citing People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488–90 (Ill. 1986); Jackson ex rel.
Jackson v. Reid, 935 N.E.2d 978, 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), as modified on denial of reh'g, (June
29, 2010); Goldberg v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 771 N.E.2d 1075, 1083–84 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); Prairie v. Snow Valley Health Res., Inc., 755 N.E.2d 1021, 1032–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001);
Costa v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 642 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also Downey v.
Dunnington, 895 N.E.2d 271, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Aug. 21,
2008)).
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“serve as a substitute for expert testimony” at trial.69 The appellate court in
Fornoff v. Parke however, suggested that an exception to the rule may
exist.70 The Fornoff court opined that a learned treatise may be admitted as
substantive evidence when their exclusion would cause “serious hardship”71
to the plaintiff. The court explained that the existence of such “serious
hardship” may be found where a plaintiff, for instance, makes a “positive
showing” that securing the live testimony of an expert is otherwise
impossible.72 The showing of serious hardship, however, may not be the
sole exception to the rule that prohibits the use of a learned treatise as
substantive evidence. By way of an analogy, in Ohligshlager v. Proctor
Community Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court also showed a willingness
to accept a drug manufacturer’s instructions pamphlet to establish the
standard of care in a medical negligence case.73 In Ohligschlager, the
defendant physician and the plaintiff’s expert both testified about the
manufacturer’s instructions that came with an intravenous drug.74 The
plaintiff’s claim was that the defendant was negligent in failing to properly
supervise the administration of the drug to the plaintiff.75 The
manufacturer’s instructions that came with the drug cautioned that
intravenous use of the drug at higher concentrations should be more closely
supervised so as to prevent certain medical complications from occurring.76
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that “there was sufficient evidence of
deviation from the manufacturer’s recommendations and instructions for
the issue of defendant [doctor’s] negligence to have been submitted to the
jury.”77 The holding in Ohligschlager suggests that the traditional rule of
inadmissibility may be relaxed in the interests of fairness.78 That same
acceptance should be extended to learned treatises.
Despite some willingness to find limited exceptions to the traditional
rule of inadmissibility of learned treatises, Illinois courts refuse to adopt
FRE 803(18). In Roach v. Springfield Clinic, the Illinois Supreme Court

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Hoem, 606 N.E.2d at 833–34.
Fornoff, 1434 N.E.2d 793, 800–01.
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 254. Walsh and Rose stated that “while Illinois has consistently
refused to admit learned treatises for their truth, one court has suggested an exception might be
made where exclusion would subject plaintiff to serious hardship.” Id. (citing Fornoff, 434
N.E.2d 793).
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9.
Ohligschlager v. Proctor Cmty. Hosp. (Ohligschlager I), 303 N.E.2d 392, 396–97 (Ill. 1973).
Ohligschlager v. Proctor Cmty. Hosp. (Ohligschlager II), 294 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
rev’d, 303 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. 1973).
Id.
Ohligschlager I, 303 N.E.2d at 395–96.
Id. at 396.
Id.
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had an opportunity to adopt FRE 803(18),79 but declined to do so.80 In
Roach, the plaintiffs sought the admissibility of medical texts to support
their argument that the defendant physicians should have performed a
certain medical procedure on the plaintiff.81 The trial court instructed the
jury that medical treatises could be used only for impeachment purposes
and not as substantive evidence.82 The plaintiffs argued that FRE 803(18)
was a “logical extension”83 of FRE 703 and 705, which the Supreme Court
had previously adopted in Wilson v. Clark.84 The plaintiffs further argued
that the limiting jury instruction “seriously undermine[d] expert testimony
based upon published treatises, which were customarily relied upon by
experts.”85 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the plaintiffs’ claim,
noting that “the admission of treatises as substantive evidence would
undermine the foundation of the hearsay rule.”86 The court explained that
unless the authors of the scientific treatises are available for crossexamination in court, “the trier of fact will not know how they collected
their data, on what they based their opinions; and whether they would apply
the same data and express the same opinions under the circumstances of the
case being tried.”87 The court therefore declined to adopt FRE 803(18).88
However, on rehearing, the court deemed FRE 803(18) inapplicable to the
case, because the plaintiffs failed to seek the admissibility of the medical
texts at issue as substantive evidence.89 The court’s ultimate decision on
79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

On the plaintiff’s appeal from a verdict for the defendants in Roach, a medical malpractice action,
the plaintiff claimed “that the medical treatise upon which their experts relied should have been
admitted as substantive evidence.” Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 237 n.268. This was not
allowed because the “admission of treatises as substantive evidence would undermine the
foundation of the hearsay rule.” Id. Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt Rule
803(18) the court stated that experts could refer to such authorities on direct examination. Id.
“The extent to which Roach remedied Schuchman is unclear, because the Supreme Court’s
opinion was withdrawn and modified on rehearing. The court’s final opinion in the case
dispensed with the learned treatise issue in short order.” Id. (discussing Roach v. Springfield
Clinic (Roach I), No. 73394, 1992 Ill. Lexis 204 (Dec. 4, 1992), superseded, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill.
1993)).
Roach v. Springfield Clinic (Roach II), 623 N.E.2d 246, 253–54 (Ill. 1993).
Roach I, No. 73394, 1992 Ill. Lexis 204 (Dec. 4, 1992), superseded, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1993)).
Id.
Id.
Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1981).
Roach I, No. 73394, 1992 Ill. Lexis 204 (Dec. 4, 1992), superseded, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roach II, 623 N.E.2d 246, 253–54 (Ill. 1993) (the Illinois Supreme Court also found the evidence
to be irrelevant to the instant case). Similarly, in Walski v. Tiesenga, the Illinois Supreme Court
declined to consider whether a medical treatise could be admitted as substantive evidence. Walski
v. Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279, 283–84 (Ill. 1978). The court noted that “it is unnecessary for us to
decide now whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may introduce medical treatises as
substantive evidence” because the plaintiff had not submitted the medical treatises at issue as
substantive evidence. Id. at 283.
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rehearing suggests that the court may not have been ready to adopt FRE
803(18) at that time.90
D. An Expert May Acknowledge Reliance on a Learned Treatise to
Explain the Basis of His or Her Opinion Pursuant to Rule 703
IRE 705 places the burden of eliciting the facts upon which an expert
based his or her opinion on the cross-examiner. It does not state whether
such facts may be brought out on direct examination.91 IRE 703 likewise
does not completely resolve the extent to which an expert may divulge the
basis for his or her opinion on direct examination.92 It merely requires that
the facts relied upon be “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field.”93 IRE 703, however, does not require that the facts or data
relied upon by the expert to be admitted in evidence and submitted to the
trier of fact.94
Although the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
in Roach that FRE 803(18) is a “logical extension”95 of FRE 703 and FRE
705, which it had previously adopted in Wilson v. Clark, the plaintiffs’
argument is persuasive.96 In 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court in Wilson v.
Clark97 adopted FRE 703 and 705,98 which were intended to “broaden the
scope of expert testimony.”99 FRE 703 and IRE 703 allow experts to “rely
on facts or data not admitted into evidence if it is ‘of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts’ in the field.” FRE 703 was intended “to bring the
judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when not
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

In the vacated Roach opinion, however, the court did go into some detail. The court relied on the
holding in People v. Anderson. Roach I, No. 73394, 1992 Ill. Lexis 204 (Dec. 4, 1992),
superseded, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1993). The court (in the vacated opinion) said that the limiting
instruction in Anderson (that an expert can explain the basis for opinion on direct in regards to
relied on materials but that the court must instruct jury that the evidence is not to be considered
substantively) was valid and allowing evidence to be substantive would undermine the foundation
of hearsay. Id.
People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ill. 1986); Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326–27
(Ill. 1981).
ILL. R. EVID. 703; Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 488.
See ILL. R. EVID. 703; Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 488.
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 235. “After People v. Anderson, it appeared that experts would be
permitted to reveal the contents of texts upon which they relied for their opinions. While the texts
themselves would remain inadmissible, they could be discussed so that the jury would understand
the expert's reasoning process.” Id. at 235–36.
Roach I, No. 73394, 1992 Ill. Lexis 204. (Dec. 4, 1992), superseded, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1993)).
Wilson, 417 N.E.2d 1322.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Griffin v. Subram, 606 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Cf. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9,
at 184 (noting that “Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 803(18) broadly delimit the materials
upon which experts may rely to formulate their opinions.”). Also noting that, “Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 is considerably broader than Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18).” Id. at 232–33.
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in court.”100 FRE 705 and IRE 705 allow an expert to testify to her opinion
without disclosing the facts underlying her reasoning.101
In Wilson, which was a medical negligence case, hospital records were
placed in evidence without proper foundation.102 The Supreme Court of
Illinois stated that the hospital records need not be in evidence so as to
serve as the basis for an expert’s medical opinion and aligned itself with the
“modern trend” under FRE 705, which allows an expert to give an opinion
without disclosing the facts underlying the basis for the opinion.103 The
Illinois Supreme Court noted that “both Federal and State courts have
interpreted Rule 703 to allow opinions based on facts not in evidence” and
that in applying the rule it is important to know “whether the information
upon which the expert bases his opinion is of the type that is reliable.”104
Similarly, the appellate court in Piano v. Davidson determined that an
expert witness can rely on facts, data, or opinions contained in a learned
treatise, and that under FRE 703 “such facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field.”105 These materials may include “reports, and opinions
from nurses, technicians, and other doctors, hospital records, and x-rays.”106
Regarding these other materials, Illinois has already adopted FRE 703 and
FRE 705 and courts have been applying this standard for decades.
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE USE OF LEARNED
TREATISES IN ILLINOIS
The current use of a learned treatise in Illinois already allows an
expert to acknowledge a learned treatise as the basis for his or her opinion
on direct examination. The extent to which an expert may discuss the
contents of the treatise on which he or she relied on direct examination,
however, varies among Illinois trial courts. To determine whether an expert
may discuss the contents of a treatise that formed the basis of his or her
opinion, some courts have attempted to distinguish between an expert’s
intent to provide a foundation for his or her opinion and the expert’s
attempt to merely bolster his or her opinion.107 The distinction between
providing a foundation for an opinion and merely bolstering the opinion,
however, remains “unclear.”108 Moreover, Illinois courts often require
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 184.
Lavin & Wolf, supra note 67, at 427–28 (quoting Wilson, 417 N.E.2d at 1326–27).
Wilson, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
Id. at 1325–26.
Id.
Piano v. Davison, 510 N.E.2d 1066, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
Id.
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 237.
Id.
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limiting instructions to reduce the likelihood that a jury would mistakenly
consider the learned treatises as substantive evidence.109
In Illinois, the inconsistent standards regarding the use and
authoritativeness of learned treatises on direct examination have given rise
to confusion. Under FRE 803(18), the standard for the use of a learned
treatise on direct examination is clearer, allowing its use as substantive
proof on direct and cross-examination, and requiring no giving of limiting
instruction.110 This section will discuss the inconsistencies in Illinois’s
treatment of learned treatises, that although an expert witness may rely on a
learned treatise during his or her testimony, there is a lack of agreement as
to whether the expert may disclose the contents.
The use of learned treatises varies among Illinois trial courts because
there appears to be no established rule or principle for uniform application.
A good example is how a learned treatise may be used on direct
examination of an expert witness. Opinions of the Illinois Appellate Court
see this problem frequently because trial courts continue to apply varied
standards to determine whether a purported treatise is “learned” or whether
a source is “authoritative.”111
A. Direct Examination
On direct examination, it is undisputed that an expert witness may
testify that he or she used a reliable source as the basis of his or her
opinion.112 Before 1965, when the Illinois Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,113 an
expert on direct examination could only refer to a learned treatise to explain
the basis of his or her opinion.114 Although it is generally permitted in
Illinois, there is confusion regarding whether an expert may read or
summarize the information contained in a learned treatise when explaining
the basis for his or her opinion on direct examination. In determining
whether an expert may be allowed to discuss the contents of a treatise that
formed the basis of his or her opinion, courts have attempted “to determine
whether the information provided represents the foundation of an opinion or
merely an effort to bolster it.”115 The distinction between providing a
109. Lewis v. Stoval, 650 N.E.2d 1074, 1076–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
110. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND
STATUTES (7th ed. 2012).
111. The term authoritative is probably outdated. See supra Part II.B.
112. Piano v. Davison, 510 N.E.2d 1066, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Lawson v. G. D. Searle &
Co., 356 N.E.2d 779, 786–87 (Ill. 1976)).
113. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 259–60 (Ill. 1965).
114. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 233 (citing Ullrich v. Chi. City Ry., 106 N.E. 828, 829 (Ill. 1914);
Bloomington v. Shrock, 110 Ill. 219 (Ill. 1884)).
115. Id. at 237.
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foundation for an opinion and merely bolstering an opinion, however,
remains “unclear.”116 The problem with current Illinois practice is that a
medical expert, for example, may “dangle[] the authoritative text before the
fact-finder but is forced to withhold the actual information upon which he
or she relies.”117
In 1976, the court in Lawson v. Searle, “expanded the admissible use
of learned treatises when it held that expert witnesses could rely on medical
literature in forming their opinions.”118 However, in 1984, the court in
Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital tightened the rule and affirmed the
trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony where the expert sought to read a
summary from his notes on his findings from certain medical literature.119
The appellate court found that it was not error to exclude the expert’s
testimony, noting its concern that the article’s authors were not available for
cross-examination.120 However, two years earlier, the court in Alton v. Kitt
allowed a defense expert to testify from the Physician’s Desk Reference
manual, because the court had found the PDR to be reliable and because the
expert had written a part of that manual.121
The court in People v. Anderson,122 according to the authors of
Expanding the Use of Medical Treatises, took Illinois “one step forward,
two steps back.”123 In Anderson, the trial court prevented a criminal
defendant’s psychiatric expert witness from disclosing the contents of the
reports upon which he based his diagnosis regarding the defendant’s mental
state at the time he had committed murder.124 The trial court, however,
allowed the expert to testify that he relied on specific reports, which
included evaluations by other psychiatrists, physicians, and counselors
made while the defendant was serving in the army and when he was
previously incarcerated, reports by the state’s psychiatric experts, and

116. Id.
117. The court in Bowman v. University of Chicago Hospitals accepted the phrases “standard,” “wellrespected,” and “good source” as sufficient foundation for the use of medical textbooks, the court
decided that the term ‘authoritative’ was not controlling. Lavin & Wolf, supra note 67, at 427–28
(discussing Bowman v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 852 N.E.2d 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
118. Lawson v. G. D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); see also Lavin & Wolf, supra
note 67, at 428 (discussing Lawson, 356 N.E.2d 779). The expert in this case was allowed to base
his conclusions on published studies where he referred to his sources as “published clinical
studies” and did not refer to them by report name, or the data drawn from the materials. Lawson,
356 N.E.2d at 786. The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the expert was not reciting hearsay
evidence but rather was giving his “medical opinion.” Id. The Supreme Court relied on part of
FRE 703 in rendering this conclusion. Id.
119. Mielke v. Condell Mem’l Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 216, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
120. Id.
121. Alton v. Kitt, 431 N.E.2d 417, 424–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
122. People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 490, 490 (Ill. 1986).
123. Lavin & Wolf, supra note 67.
124. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 490.
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information relating to the defendant’s previous criminal offense.125
Although Anderson did not deal with learned treatises, its treatment of the
disclosure of materials on which an expert bases his or her opinion is
equally relevant to the disclosure of facts in a learned treatise.
The Illinois Supreme Court held in Anderson that
an expert may reveal the basis of his opinion because to prevent the expert
from referring to the contents of materials upon which he relied in arriving
at his conclusion places an unreal stricture on him and compels him to be
not only less than frank with the jury but also . . . to appear to base his
diagnosis upon reasons which are flimsy and inconclusive when in fact
they may not be.126

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that, “[w]ithout a full
explanation of witness’s reasoning, juries would find the expert testimony
to be meaningless.”127 However, the court limited the use of such evidence:
the “underlying facts and conclusions of an expert’s opinion [can]not be
allowed for substantive purposes,” and it required the trial judge to give “a
limiting jury instruction to avoid the danger of the jury ‘misusing the
information.’”128
The court in Anderson “acknowledged that neither Wilson nor FRE
703 addressed the question of whether facts could be provided to the jury,”
concluding that, based on the underlying logic of the rule, the “expert
should be allowed to reveal the contents of materials upon which he
reasonably relies in order to explain the basis for his opinion.”129 The court
explained that “[s]ince Federal Rule of Evidence 703 was designed to
broaden the basis of expert testimony and to allow experts to function more
naturally in the courtroom, ‘it would be both illogical and anomalous to
deprive the jury of the reasons supporting that opinion.’”130 The court
concluded that the disclosure of the contents of the reports did not violate
the hearsay rule, because the information was not offered to show the truth
of the matter asserted, but merely to explain the basis of the expert’s
opinion.131
Following Anderson, Illinois courts continued to struggle with the
question: should an expert be allowed on direct examination to reveal the
contents of the materials that he or she relied on in forming the basis for

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 488.
Lavin & Wolf, supra note 67, at 429 (quoting Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 489).
Id.
Id. (citing Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 488).
Id.
Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 488–89.
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their opinions?132 In Schuchman v. Stackable, the appellate court held that
an expert could not recite from learned treatises even though they formed a
part of the basis for his opinion.133 Rather than relying on Anderson, the
court used Mielke134 to hold that an expert could not read from or
summarize materials in a learned treatise that he or she relied on.135 The
court noted that, as in Mielke,136 the proposed testimony of the expert “did
not directly concern plaintiff’s treatment,” concluding that the proposed
testimony summarizing the expert’s notes that he had taken while reviewing
medical literature was essentially the same as reading the underlying facts
and data into evidence.137 The court disapproved of allowing such facts and
data into evidence given the fact that the author of the treatise was not
available for cross-examination.138 The court distinguished Wilson v.
Clark139 where the defense expert was allowed to respond to a hypothetical
question, which was based on facts contained in the plaintiff’s medical
chart.140 The facts and data were therefore directly related to the
litigation.141
The dissent in Schuchman sought to give juries greater access to
information, finding that the court’s majority interpreted the case law
incorrectly when it relied on Mielke.142 The dissent determined that
Anderson had implicitly overruled Mielke and that the treatises were of
“particularly trustworthy nature” and that to allow their admissibility would
serve the interest of judicial economy.143
Several courts, applying Schuchman, have incorrectly refused to allow
experts from discussing the medical treatise which formed the basis for
their opinions.144 However, they generally do allow the experts to refer to
articles that they have authored.145 For instance, in Toppel v. Redondo, the
appellate court found that the defendant’s medical expert’s reference on
direct examination to an article he authored was permissible, since the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 254.
Schuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Mielke v. Condell Mem’l Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Lavin & Wolf, supra note 67, at 429 (citing Schuchman, 555 N.E.2d at 1024–26).
Mielke, 463 N.E.2d 216.
Schuchman, 555 N.E.2d at 1026.
Id.
Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1981).
Schuchman, 555 N.E.2d at 1026 (citing Wilson, 417 N.E.2d at 1325–26).
Id.
Id. at 1026–27 (Chapman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1038. The dissent argued that there was “no legitimate difference between use of learned
treatises during cross-examination and as part of the basis of an expert’s opinion because in both
situations they were offered for non-substantive reasons.” Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 236
n.261 (citing Schuchman, 555 N.E.2d at 1028 (Chapman, J., dissenting)).
144. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 254 (citing Toppel v. Redondo, 617 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Weekley v. Indus. Comm’n, 615 N.E.2d 59, 63–64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)).
145. Toppel, 617 N.E.2d at 405.
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expert “simply identified the article as one that he authored and at no point
discussed or relied on the article during his testimony.”146
Some Illinois courts appear to allow expert testimony about the
contents of learned articles when they are not used to simply bolster the
expert’s own opinion or to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In
Kochan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,147 the court distinguished148
Schuchman and Mielke, explaining that the materials relied on by the
experts in Schuchman and Mielke on direct examination were “not directly
pertinent to the litigation or to the plaintiff’s treatment.”149 The court in
Kochan found it significant that the expert did not use the articles “to show
that other experts agreed with him or . . . that the articles proved the truth of
the matter asserted.”150 Rather, in Kochan, the court determined that the
articles relied on by the expert were necessary for the expert to explain his
opinion and why he had come to that opinion.151
In Lewis v. Stoval, the trial court admitted two medical articles in
evidence and allowed the experts to read them and then submitted them to
the jury during deliberation with no limiting instructions.152 The articles
were used on direct examination only and not for cross-examination or on
146. Id. at 405.
147. Kochan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 610 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) overruled by
Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009).
148. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 236–37. Walsh and Rose argue that although the testimony was
admitted the court’s reasoning was not “comforting.” Id. Their article asserts that Schuchman
and Kochan are not “easily reconciled.” Id.
We believe that Schuchman is limited to those situations where the expert is not using
the content of the medical literature as a basis for his or her opinion but rather the
expert is attempting to bolster his opinion by showing that other experts agree with
him. The expert witness then becomes a conduit for bringing before the jury a number
of opinions of other experts without incurring the cost of hiring such experts and
without subjecting these other experts to cross-examination. Under these
circumstances it does not matter if the witness is an expert in the field for which he is
called, but rather the only question is whether the witness can read!
Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 236–37. The article adds, “[i]t is difficult first to determine
whether the information provided represents the foundation of an opinion or merely an effort to
bolster it. What is the difference anyway? In short, despite the plain language of People v.
Anderson, the circumstances under which experts may discuss authoritative texts in Illinois still
remain unclear.” Id. (citing Charles F. Redden, Limits on Admitting Learned Treatise, 82 ILL. B.J.
186 (1994)).
149. Kochan, 610 N.E.2d at 697–98, overruled by Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009).
150. Id. at 697–98.
151. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 236 (citing Kochan, 610 N.E.2d at 697–98, overruled by Nolan v.
Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009)). The case was assessed/cited before it was overruled
by Nolan, which directly overruled the holding that evidence of other asbestos exposures was not
admissible; however, there was no mention of admission of articles. The court in Kochan allowed
the expert witness to read “the underlying data and information on which he based his opinion that
asbestos was linked to asbestosis by 1930 and to lung cancer between 1949 and 1955.” Kochan,
610 N.E.2d at 697.
152. Lewis v. Stoval, 650 N.E.2d 1074, 1075–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). About 1–2 sentences from each
article were read to the jury.
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rebuttal.153 The appellate court nevertheless affirmed, holding that the error
was harmless.154 The first article was partially written by the expert and the
second one was referenced in the expert’s article.155 The trial court allowed
the experts to read statements from the articles on direct examination
despite the defense’s objection that it was hearsay.156 The plaintiff relied on
Anderson to argue that the “articles were admitted for the limited purpose
of showing the materials” on which the expert relied.157 The court,
however, distinguished Anderson, stating that in Anderson the material
relied on was relevant to the issues and directly concerned the defendant’s
sanity.158 The Stoval court noted that “the Anderson court was not saying
such materials were not hearsay. They were admissible for the limited
purpose of explaining the basis for the expert’s opinion and the jury should
be so instructed.”159 Does this imply that had there been a limiting
instruction the use of the articles would not have been in error?160 It
appears unlikely that a limiting instruction would have been enough. In
addition to the absence of a limiting instruction, the appellate court also
considered whether the materials pertained to the treatment of the plaintiff
and the fact that the materials were allowed to go to the jury during
deliberations.161 In other words, the absence of limiting instructions was
not the appellate court’s only determinative factor.
As illustrated above, the courts are struggling to make sense of which
standard to apply when determining whether a treatise is authoritative and
how the contents of an authoritative treatise may be used at trial. The
confusion stems from the lack of an established rule or clear guideline or
standard. Although it is clear that an expert witness may rely on a learned
treatise as the basis for his or her opinion, the various attempts to
distinguish situations in which to allow disclosure of the contents of the
learned treatise are confusing and difficult for litigators and for trial courts
to follow. Hopefully, the adoption of FRE 803(18) will remedy the
problem.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1076 (citing People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488–89 (Ill. 1986)).
Id.
Id.
Assuming that the articles were also on point and not submitted as exhibits to the jury. In the
Lewis case the articles used addressed how rapidly certain antibiotics penetrate human tissues but
the defendant’s use of antibiotics was not at issue. Id. The Anderson case used medical reports
that discussed the defendant’s sanity, which was an issue. People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485
(Ill. 1986).
161. Lewis, 650 N.E.2d at 1076–77.
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IV. ADOPTING A LEARNED TREATISE EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE WILL REMOVE THE DISCREPANCY AMONG
TRIAL COURTS AND MAKE TRIALS MORE EFFICIENT
Adopting the federal rule will increase the effectiveness of trials in
Illinois. It would decrease the amount of confusion and misinterpretation of
various rules that already exist, such as Supreme Court Rule 213 and IRE
703 and 705. To best transition into an established practice on the
admissibility of learned treatises as an exception to hearsay, Illinois should
adopt FRE 803(18).
A. Adoption of FRE 803(18) in Illinois Will Allow for the Full
Implementation of IRE 703
To ensure the full implementation of IRE 703, Illinois should adopt
FRE 803(18). The two rules would operate “in tandem” to “permit experts
to refer to a broad spectrum of information in reaching their opinion and
conveying them to the fact finder.”162 The failure to adopt FRE 803(18) or
an equivalent, but having adopted IRE 703, will leave Illinois trial judges
without clear guidance as to what information relied on by an expert may
be disclosed to the fact finder and would prevent the fact finder from
obtaining such valuable information.163
B. Most of the Principles Underlying FRE 803(18) Are Already Well
Established in Illinois
Illinois already sets out similar standards for determining the
authoritativeness of a learned treatise as the federal rule and the process for
cross-examining the expert with learned treatises parallels the federal rules.
The most significant change in adopting a hearsay exception for a learned
treatise in Illinois would be to admit the treatise as substantive evidence.
Even this change, however, would not be absolutely new to Illinois as noted
by the appellate court in Fornoff, in suggesting that there may already be an
exception for admissibility of learned treatises as substantive evidence.164
The federal rule allows for statements that are “called to the attention of the
expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct
162. Walsh & Rose, supra note 9, at 254.
163. Id.
164. Although courts cite Fornoff for its holding that generally treatises cannot be used as substantive
evidence (Costa v. Dresser Indus., 624 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Goldberg v. Dep’t of
Prof’l Regulation, 771 N.E.2d 1075, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)), courts do not seem to note that an
exception might exist. Fornoff v. Parke Davis & Co., 434 N.E.2d 793, 800–01 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982).
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examination.”165 This is the same standard as the one used in Illinois.
Under FRE 803(18), learned treatises can be based on history, medicine,
other sciences, or art.166 Due to their inherent reliability, these scholarly
works are permitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted.167
Aside from treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets, there are other
acceptable forms of evidence, including charts, almanacs, government
publications, and videotapes.168 To avoid the misuse of these other
acceptable forms of evidence by the jury, they may not be offered as
substantive evidence absent accompanying expert testimony, and may not
be received as exhibits.169
C. The Existing Opposition to the Adoption of a Learned Treatise
Exception Is Not Sufficient
There exist several arguments against the adoption of an Illinois
learned treatise hearsay exception. All of these arguments, however, have
already been addressed and rejected at the federal level in the adoption of
FRE 803(18). The most frequent objections are that: (1) “scholarly works
of technical nature” may confuse and mislead the trier of fact into giving
the material undue weight;170 (2) the proponent of the evidence could
present materials out of context or may distort them;171 (3) there is an
inference that live testimony by an expert in “resolving technical issues [is
superior to] consultation of written works”;172 (4) with the fields of art,
science, and history constantly changing and evolving, learned treatises are
likely to become quickly outdated and may create the possibility of
misinformation being introduced to the trier of fact;173 and (5) the adoption
of the learned treatise exception would lead to the rise of preparation of
165. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
166. See generally WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 35, at 670. See also Constantino v. Herzog,
203 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2000); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 557
F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Montana Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 185 F.2d 491,
498 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
167. 7 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803:18 (7th ed. 2013).
168. See Constantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that an authoritative videotape
can be used as a learned treatise); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 1978)
(discussion on handwriting characteristics chart, taken from a learned treatise, was considered
proper under 803(18)); Bair v. Am. Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1973) (referring to
documents other than medical treatises that can be considered learned treatises, the court noted
“that there are many other such works, including, besides annuity tables, almanacs, astronomical
calculations, tables of logarithms [sic], interest tables, weather reports, and tables of the rise and
fall of the tide, all of which have been admitted in evidence”).
169. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
170. Id.
171. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE §5.5 (2014).
172. Id. § 5.4.
173. Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974).
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scientific material specifically for litigation.174 Each of these arguments has
been discredited, and the “drafters of [FRE] 803(18) [have] found that the
concerns underlying the hearsay objection [were] not significant.”175
First, the concerns regarding the possibility that the “technical nature”
of certain publications may confuse and mislead the trier of fact into giving
the material undue weight are ameliorated by the fact that a learned treatise
will not be admitted in evidence absent testimony of an expert witness.176
The introduction of learned treatises via expert testimony reduces and often
eliminates the problem of misunderstanding the evidence by the trier of
fact.177 Similarly, the prohibition against allowing learned treatises as
exhibits reduces the possibility that triers of fact will attempt to understand
the treatises without professional guidance.178
One Illinois court has already addressed how FRE 803(18) minimizes
the danger that the trier of fact could misuse the contents of a learned
treatise. In Downey v. Dunnington the appellate court recognized that while
learned treatises may be trustworthy, they are not intended to be understood
by a lay person.179 The appellate court noted that FRE 803(18) provides
two ways in which these issues are avoided by: (1) offering an opportunity
for the expert to testify and to explain the learned treatise and its application
to the case before it can be used as substantive evidence; or (2) prohibiting
the treatise itself from being admitted in evidence.
Opponents of FRE 803(18) nevertheless fear that there is potential for
evidence to be distorted or to be considered out of context by the trier of
fact.180 Proponents of the learned treatise hearsay exception, however, are
confident that the “adversarial process” would provide “a sufficient
safeguard to this type of abuse.”181

174. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 803-82 (10th ed.
2011).
175. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 35, at 667;
KAYE, supra note 171.
176. FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (“If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as
an exhibit.”); Bair v. Am. Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740, 745 (3d Cir. 1973).
177. Sharbono v. Hilborn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶36, n.4, 12 N.E.3d 530 (discussing the
possibility of getting out a medical opinion on direct examination and the importance of the crossexamination of that expert).
178. See Alton v. Kitt, 431 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that a PDR is a trustworthy
text, “we believe a vigorous cross-examination would cure any objection to a medical expert's
reference to it when testifying”).
179. Downey v. Dunnington, 895 N.E.2d 271, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
180. KAYE, supra note 171, §5.5 (2014). See also Wilson v. Knight, 26 Kan. App. 2d 226, 229 (1999)
(discussing the discretionary role of a judge in admitting learned treatises and protecting jury from
unnecessary confusion in both the Federal Rule of Evidence and the Kansas Rule of Evidence).
181. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 35, at 667.
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Opponents further argued that live testimony of experts would be a
better means to resolve technical issues.182 There is, however, no evidence
to support the argument that a testifying expert has a superior depth of
knowledge to that of a published author on the same topic.183 In addition,
the knowledge possessed by a testifying expert witness may be just as
outdated as the information contained in a learned treatise.184 Just as a
testifying expert must be qualified, the author of a learned treatise must be
recognized as reliable prior to any use of the publication.185 Moreover, any
“deficiencies” in the contents of a learned treatise can be thoroughly
illuminated and explained by the testifying expert.186
Another argument that is being advanced against the adoption of FRE
803(18) is that a publication may become obsolete because art, history, and
science change at such a rapid pace.187 But that can also be said of an
expert who can easily be “just as outdated as a publication,”188 and the
adversarial process of cross-examination safeguards against the
introduction of obsolete materials.189 On cross-examination, the expert
could be questioned in-depth about the extent of the current use of the
publication, allowing for the disclosure that the work was obsolete or
outdated.190 Moreover, to ensure and to retain the respect of colleagues in
the respective professions, authors of learned treatises have the incentive to
be truthful and accurate in their writing.191 Additionally safeguarding
against out-of-date publications is the reality that the publisher of such
publication arguably lacks the “motive to misrepresent,” since the
publication will be closely scrutinized by professionals in that particular
field, and “its reputation [will] depend[] upon the correctness of the
material published.”192
182. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 2d 761, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
183. KAYE, supra note 171, § 5.4.2.
Just as the live expert could not discuss these reports as the basis for a causal
inference, in a jurisdiction that screens out dubious scientific evidence, the writings
cannot be introduced for this purpose. Consistent with this analysis, no court has held
that learned treatises are exempt from Daubert or Frye scrutiny.
Id. (citing Shelton v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 277 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2002)).
184. Id. See also Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d
Cir. 1974).
185. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1184 (7th Cir. 1994).
186. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
187. Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974).
188. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 35, at 668.
189. Id.
190. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 1978).
191. Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987); Robert F. Magill, Jr., Issues Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18): The “Learned Treatise” Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 9 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 49, 59 (1993).
192. See Downey v. Dunnington, 895 N.E.2d 271, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). The court said that “the
hearsay objection must be regarded as unimpressive” because “a high standard of accuracy” is
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Lastly, some argue that the adoption of the learned treatise exception
would lead to the rise of purchased publications specifically designed for
litigation.193 As in the case of exposing the possible bias of an expert
witness, the bias of a learned treatise could be exposed in the process of
cross-examination. Moreover, a learned treatise would be subjected to
public scrutiny and peer review in the expert author’s field before it is
presented as evidence in litigation.194 Ultimately, a publication which is
prepared for litigation would not be deemed learned or authoritative and
therefore it would not be admitted in evidence.195
Codification of an Illinois equivalent to FRE 803(18) would bring
Illinois in line with numerous other states that have adopted the rule, and
would more accurately reflect the current needs of litigation practice.
States that have adopted FRE 803(18) or similar rules that allow an expert
witness to divulge relevant statements from a learned treatise on direct
examination include the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.196 Additionally, several other states allow the
introduction of learned treatises as exhibits: Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Louisiana, and New Hampshire.197 Only a few states still limit the use of
learned treatises to cross-examination and impeachment: Florida, Michigan,
Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee,198 while Maine and Massachusetts took out
the reference to direct examinations.199 The adoption of a learned treatise
exception to the hearsay rule would allow Illinois to join the majority of the
nation and provide consistent guidance to Illinois practitioners and judges.
V. CONCLUSION
Illinois needs a clear and consistent rule regarding the admissibility
and use of learned treatises. The arguments opposing the adoption of a

193.
194.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

engaged by factors mentioned in the FRE 803(18) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed
Rules. Id.
SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 174, at 803–82; See also SPECIAL SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON ILLINOIS EVIDENCE PUBLIC HEARINGS, ARCHIVES, §§ 13:23–14:9 (May 20, 2010).
United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 312 (6th Cir. 2009); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(18)
advisory committee’s notes; 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1692 (3d ed. 1940)
SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 174.
WALTER R. LANCASTER & DAMIAN D. CAPOZZOLA, EXPERT WITNESSES IN CIVIL TRIALS § 10:10
(Oct. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.

298

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

learned treatise hearsay exception are unsubstantiated and unpersuasive. To
allow for the full realization of IRE 703 and IRE 705, Illinois should adopt
the federal learned treatise hearsay exception. It will provide clarity and
consistency to the admissibility of expert testimony, which is badly needed
in Illinois.

